Re-Regulate Financial Markets?--Posner's Comment

需要重新加强对金融市场的管制吗？  

原文地址 ：http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2008/04/reregulate_fina.html  

作者：理查德·波斯纳  

翻译：fenglf

I no longer believe that deregulation has been a complete, an unqualified, success. As I indicated in my posting of last week, deregulation of the airline industry appears to be a factor in the serious deterioration of service, which I believe has imposed substantial costs on travelers, particularly but not only business travelers; and the partial deregulation of electricity supply may have been a factor in the western energy crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the ensuing Enron debacle. The deregulation of trucking, natural gas, and pipelines has, in contrast, probably been an unqualified success, and likewise the deregulation of the long-distance telecommunications and telecommunications terminal equipment markets, achieved by a combination of deregulatory moves by the Federal Communications Commission beginning in 1968 and the government antitrust suit that culminated in the breakup of AT&T in 1983.

我不再相信放松管制可以是完全的彻底的成功了。正如我上周在博文中指出的，对航空业管制的放松可能是其服务质量恶化的一个原因，我相信这给旅行者增加了大量的成本，特别是但不限于商务旅行者；减少对电力供应的局部管制是导致2000年到2001年西部能源危机和后来的安然事件的一个原因。相比之下，对货运、天然气及其管道的管制的放松则可能是较为彻底的成功。同样，对长途电信业和电信终端设备市场的管制的放松，最终由联邦通讯委员会始于1986年的一系列放松管制行动，以及政府对AT&T的垄断起诉（最终导致其于1983年被拆分）来完成了。

  Although one must be tentative in evaluating current events, I suspect that the deregulation (though again partial) of banking has been a factor in the current credit crisis. The reason is related to Becker's very sensible suggestion that, given the moral hazard created by government bailouts of failing financial institutions, a tighter ceiling should be placed on the risks that banks are permitted to take. Because of federal deposit insurance, banks are able to borrow at low rates and depositors (the lenders) have no incentive to monitor what the banks do with their money. This encourages risk taking that is excessive from an overall social standpoint and was the major factor in the savings and loan collapse of the 1980s. Deregulation, by removing a variety of restrictions on permitted banking activities, has allowed commercial banks to engage in riskier activities than they previously had been allowed to engage in, such as investing in derivatives and in subprime mortgages, and thus deregulation helped to bring on the current credit crunch. At the same time, investment banks such as Bear Sterns have been allowed to engage in what is functionally commercial banking; their lenders do not have deposit insurance--but their lenders are banks that for the reason stated above are happy to make risky loans.

虽然对于评价当前的事物我们必须谨慎，但是我仍然对认为银行业的放松管制(虽然是局部的)是最近的信用危机的一个原因的看法持怀疑态度。原因和贝克尔的非常明智的建议有关，由于道德风险是这个失败的金融体系的紧急援助行为造成的，那么就应该给银行们被允许所冒的风险一个更紧的上限。由于联邦存款保险，银行可以以很低的利率借到钱，同时也没有什么能激励存款人去监督他们的钱是如果被银行使用的。从整个社会的立场的来看这鼓励了过分的冒险行为，这也是上世纪80年代存贷危机的主要原因。放松管制(银行被允许从事的活动的各种限制的取消)使得商业银行被准许从事比以往风险更大的业务，如投资衍生品和次级抵押贷款，并且放松管制也促进了目前的信贷紧缩局面出现。同时，投资银行如贝尔斯登，也被准许从事原属于商业银行的业务，投资银行的存款者没有存款保险，但是这些存款者主要是银行，正如上面提到原因，他们乐意做一些危险的贷款业务。


  The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 required the FDIC to base deposit insurance premiums on an assessment of the riskiness of each banking institution, and last year the Commission issued regulations implementing the statutory directive. But, as far as I can judge, the risk-assessed premiums vary within a very narrow band and are not based on an in-depth assessment of the individual bank’s riskiness.

《2005联邦存款保险改革法案》要求联邦存款保险公司以各金融机构的风险评估为基础来收取存款保险费用，去年委员会颁布措施贯彻执行改革法案。就我判断，这种以风险评估为基础的收费的变化区间将非常窄，而且其对每个银行的风险评估也并不够深入彻底。


   Now it is tempting to think that deregulation has nothing to do with this, that the problem is that the banks mistakenly believed that their lending was not risky. I am skeptical. I do not think that bubbles are primarily due to avoidable error. I think they are due to inherent uncertainty about when the bubble will burst. You don't want to sell (or lend, in the case of banks) when the bubble is still growing, because then you may be leaving a lot of money on the table. There were warnings about an impending collapse of housing prices years ago, but anyone who heeded them lost a great deal of money before his ship came in. (Remember how Warren Buffett was criticized in the late 1990s for missing out on the high-tech stock boom.) I suspect that the commercial and investment banks and hedge funds were engaged in rational risk taking, but that (except in the case of the smaller hedge funds--the largest, judging from the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, are also considered by federal regulators too large to be permitted to go broke) they took excessive risks because of the moral hazard created by deposit insurance and bailout prospects.

那么现在，我们很可能会认为放松管制并不是导致金融危机原因，认为问题主要是银行错误相信他们的贷款业务是没有风险的。我对此表示怀疑。我不认为泡沫的起因是由于本可避免的错误行为，我认为是由于泡沫何时爆发天然的不确定性。当泡沫还在增长时，你是不会愿意卖出（或者借出，就银行而言）已持有的相关资产的，因为那样的话，你的钱将闲置起来（错过增值的机会）。数年前曾有过房市可能崩溃的警告，但是留心警告的人都貌似将损失一大笔钱（请回忆上世纪90年代末期沃伦巴菲特在错过高科技股暴涨的机会时是如何饱受批评的）。我推测商业银行、投资银行和对冲基金（除了那些较小的对冲基金，那些最大的对冲基金(以1998年政府援助的长期资本管理基金为标准)都被联邦监管人员认为是规模太大不能被允许破产。）本来都是很理性的冒一些风险，但是由于存款保险和可预期的政府援助造成的道德风险使他们也敢过分地冒险从事了


Perhaps what the savings and loan and now the broader financial-industry crises reveal is the danger of partial deregulation. Full deregulation would entail eliminating both government deposit insurance (especially insurance that is not experience-rated or otherwise proportioned to risk) and bailouts. Partial deregulation can create the worst of all possible worlds, as the western energy crisis may also illustrate, by encouraging firms to take risks secure in the knowledge that the downside risk is truncated.

也许存贷危机以及现在含义更广的金融业的危机向我们揭示的是局部放松管制的危害。而全面的放松管制要求政府取消存款保险(especially insurance that is not experience-rated or otherwise proportioned to risk)和紧急援助。局部的放松管制能造成你能想象的最坏的结果，如西部能源危机所揭示的，局部放松管制鼓励企业安然无忧的冒险，因为他们知道下降的风险已经被截断了。


  There has I think been a tendency of recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic but especially the former, not to take regulation very seriously. This tendency expresses itself in deep cuts in staff and in the appointment of regulatory administrators who are either political hacks or are ideologically opposed to regulation. (I have long thought it troublesome that Alan Greenspan was a follower of Ayn Rand.) This would be fine if zero regulation were the social desideratum, but it is not. The correct approach is to carve down regulation to the optimal level but then finance and staff and enforce the remaining regulatory duties competently and in good faith. Judging by the number of scandals in recent years involving the regulation of health, safety, and the environment, this is not being done. And to these examples should probably be added the weak regulation of questionable mortgage practices and of rating agencies' conflicts of interest and, more basically, a failure to appreciate the gravity of the moral hazard problem in the financial industry.

我想最近共和党和民主党(特别是共和党)都出现了一种对管制不太重视的趋势。这一趋势表现在他们对职员的大量裁决，以及任命的监管官员不是政治投机客就是意识形态上反对监管的人。（我一个长期的困惑是格林斯潘居然是Ayn Rand的崇拜者)。如果零管制是社会需要的那将很好，但并不是这样。正确的途径是将管制减少到最佳的水平，并通过增加财力人力物力全力做好剩余的管制内容。并且恪守诚信原则，通过近几年与卫生、安全和环境的管制相关的丑闻可以看到，还有许多要做的。还有一些不能不提的例子：对有问题的抵押按揭行为和评估机构在利率上的冲突较差的管理，以及更根本，即对金融业中的道德风险问题的严重性的错误认识。

英语高手帮忙看看下划线的句子 谢谢

提醒读者，对美联储所谓的“救助”的负面效果，与国内的直接救助是质的差别。

此救助非直接的救助，钱是给胜者用于收购败者的，而非直接给败者。败机构的股东和团队基本上面临的是灭顶之灾，不要说割肉，可能连骨头渣子都保不住一点。贝尔斯登的股东如是，当年LTCM的投资人、合伙人也如是。

与一般行家相反，我是非常欣赏联储的这种救助的。它加速了进化而非延缓之，它的援助使得收购方有足够的流动性避免败方的危机敲诈。

我认为这是美联储最好的角色。它不试图通过控制来避免灾难发生，那会使它自己成为最大的灾难。

我这个观点与很多行家不同。由于研究不多，尚未看到有足够证据能让我改变想法的。

【贝克尔-波斯纳博客】贝克尔：金融市场需要更强的监管吗？-
Greater Regulation of Financial Markets? Becker
金融市场需要更强的监管吗？

原文地址：http://www.becker-posner-blog.co ... reater_regulat.html

作者：加里·贝克尔

翻译：fenglf  冯

The major deregulation movement of the past 100 years started with the Ford and Carter administrations in the 1970s, and continued through the Reagan years. This movement came to an end with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 under the administration of George W. Bush. Since then some sectors, such as labor markets and product safety, have been regulated much more extensively, while others, including commercial and investment banking, have had no further declines in the extent of regulation. Despite the considerable and tangible successes of this deregulation movement, the pressure is intense to significantly increase the regulations affecting consumer safety, the introduction of new drugs, and especially financial markets.

过去100年中主要的放松管制浪潮始于20世纪70年代福特和卡特政府时期，一直持续到里根时代，直到在乔治·布什政府时期，1990年颁布《美国残疾人法案》后才告一段落。从那以后，一些领域，如劳动力市场和生产安全开始有了更深入的管制规范，与此同时在其它一些领域包括商业和投资银行业并没有因为管制的波及有很大的衰退。尽管取消管制运动取得了切实可观的效果，但是在加强消费者安全方面的监管还存在着很大的压力。比如，新药的引进，特别是对金融市场的监管。   

The 1970s saw a bipartisan reduction in the regulation of airline travel, trucking, security exchanges, and commercial banking. Measures of the success of this deregulation include sharp declines in the cost of air travel and of shipping goods by truck, huge reductions in commissions on stock transactions, and higher interest rates on bank deposits. Not only has no serious attempt been made to re-regulate these activities, but also European and many other nations on all continents have copied the American deregulation of airlines and securities.

20世纪70年代，美国民主共和两党达成共识，放松了对航空旅行、货运、证券交易和商业银行的管制。放松管制取得成功的措施包括：航空旅行和货车运输成本的急剧下调、大幅度消减股票交易佣金、更高的银行存款利率。不但美国无意重新管制这些领域，而且欧洲和其它各大洲很多其它国家效仿了美国的行为，放松了对航空和证券业的管制。   

The impetus to tighter regulations varies from sector to sector, although there is a growing belief that many activities are insufficiently regulated. Obviously, the current turmoil in the financial sector is stimulating many proposals to regulate extensively various types of financial transactions. Yet it is not obvious that the problems in the financial sector resulted mainly because of insufficient regulation. For example, commercial banks are probably the most heavily regulated group in the financial sector, yet they are in much greater difficulties than say the hedge fund industry, which is one of the least regulated industries in the financial sector. Banks participated very extensively in originating mortgages, including subprime mortgages, and in buying mortgage-backed securities, and so they are suffering from the high foreclosure rates, and the sharp decline in the market value of these securities.

加强管制的力度在各个领域都不相同，尽管人们认为还有很多地方管制的还不够。很明显，金融领域最近的危机刺激了很多对金融交易各个方面进行管制的建议出现。然而金融领域的问题并不主要是因为管制不足造成的。比如，商业银行是金融领域管制最重部分，然后它们却比对冲基金业面临更多严重的麻烦，而对冲基金业是金融业里管制最少的部分了。银行广泛的参与了放贷业务，其中包括次级抵押贷款，并参与了购买抵押证券。最终他们因为极高的丧失抵押赎回权比率而蒙受损失，这些证券的市场价值也急剧下滑。  

One reason why extensive regulation of commercial banks did not prevent many banks from getting into trouble is that bank examiners became optimistic along with banks about the risks associated with mortgages and other bank assets because the market priced these assets as if they carried little risk. It would run counter to human nature for regulators to take a skeptical attitude toward the riskiness of various assets when the market is indicating that these assets are not so risky, and when originating and holding these assets has been quite profitable. One can expect regulators to mainly follow rather than lead the market in assessing riskiness and other asset characteristics.

对商业银行广泛的管制并没有阻止其陷入困境的一个原因是银行审查人员和银行一样对贷款和其它资产的风险都变得很乐观，因为这些资产的市场价格显示其风险似乎非常小。当市场显示这些资产的风险并不大，发行和持有这些资产是十分有利可图时，监管者此时却对这些资产持怀疑态度，这显然人性背道而驰的。可以看出，在风险和其它的资产特征的分析上，监管者不但不是引路人反而成了跟风者。   

To some extent that was also true of the Fed's behavior during the past few years. I believe that Alan Greenspan is right in claiming that the main cause of the housing boom was not the Fed's actions but the worldwide low interest rates due to an abundant world supply of savings. The demand for very durable assets like housing is greatly increased by low interest rates. Still, the Fed seems to have contributed to the booming demand for housing and other assets by keeping the federal funds rate artificially low during the boom years of 2003-05.

从某种程度上说美联储过去几年的做法也是正确的。我相信艾伦·格林斯潘的话是对的，即主张房市的急速繁荣主要不是因为美联储的原因，而是因为全球存款储备的充裕供应引致的全世界的低利率。由于低利率，对如房屋这样非常耐用的资产的需求大幅增加。然而，美联储由于在2003至2005年的快速繁荣时期保持了较低的联邦基金利率，这看上去像是导致人们对住房和其它资产需求暴增的原因。

In evaluating the need for greater financial regulation, one should also not forget that the American economy greatly outperformed the European and Japanese economies during the past 25 years. Might that not be related in part to the fact that the United States led the way with major financial innovations like investment banks, hedge funds, futures and derivative markets, and private equity funds that were only lightly regulated? An infrequent period of financial turmoil may be the price that has to be paid for more rapid growth in income and low unemployment. Rapid income and employment growth might be worth an occasional period of turmoil especially if they do not lead to prolonged slowdowns in the real part of the economy. So far the effects on GDP and employment have not been severe, although the financial distress is not yet completely over.

当我们评估是否需要更强的金融管制的时候，我们也不能忘记了在过去25年美国经济大大地超过了欧洲和日本经济的发展水平。这或许与美国在金融领域的创新没多大关系？这些创新包括：投资银行、对冲基金、期货及衍生品市场，以及私人股权基金，它们都只受到很少的管制。偶有发生的金融危机，可能是为了收入更快速的增长以及低失业率而不得不付出的代价。收入增加和就业上升也许是值得人们为此经历一个短暂的金融危机，特别是当它们并不会对造成经济实质性的持续减速时。到目前为止，对GDP和就业的影响还没有特别严峻，虽然这场金融危机还没有完全结束。   

Nevertheless, a few important regulatory changes are probably warranted. For the first time the Fed allowed investment banks access to its federal funds window, and the Fed guaranteed $29 billion worth of mortgage-backed assets to induce J.P. Morgan to take over that investment company. Since these types of Fed actions would likely be repeated in the event of future financial turmoil, investment banks would have an incentive to take on additional risk since they can reasonably expect to be helped out by the Fed in the future. For this reason it might be desirable for the government to impose upper bounds on the permissible ratios of assets to equity held by investment banks. The ratio of assets to the equity of the five leading investment banks did increase greatly from about 23 in 2004 to the highly leveraged level of 30 in 2007.

然而，对一些管制措施的重要调整是有必要。美联储首次允许投资银行接近他们的联邦基金窗口，并对价值290亿的抵押资产提供担保以吸引J.P.摩根接管这家投资公司（贝尔斯登）。由于美联储这次的行为在未来的金融危机中很可能会重复出现，这使得投资银行有了去承受额外风险的激励，因为他们会理性地期望在外来政府依然会帮助他们(摆脱困境)。因此，对政府来说限制投资银行的资产权益比率的上限，使其在一个可容忍的范围之内的做法是必要的。五家最大的投资银行的资产权益比率从2004年的23大幅度增加到2007年的30这一影响巨大的高位。   

Other regulations of financial institutions may also be merited, but elaborate new regulations of the financial sector would be counterproductive. For example, the Fed has proposed limits on how much mortgage interest rates can exceed the prime rate for low-income borrowers with poor credit ratings. This would be a foolish intervention into the details of credit contracts that have all the defects of usury laws.

出台针一些针对其它金融体系中的管制措施也是必要的，但是复杂精细的新的规例很可能会产生适得其反。例如，美联储曾提议将低信用评级的低收入的贷款者的按揭利率超出最优惠利率的范围做一个限制。这是一个愚蠢的干预，信用合约的细节包含了所有可能触犯高利贷发的情况。

The financial sector has served the economy well by managing, dividing, and pricing different types of risks in the economy. It would be a mistake if Congress and the President allow the present financial turmoil to panic them into inefficient new financial regulations.

金融部门通过管理、区分和评估不同的经济风险很好地为经济发展服务。国会和总统如果对现在的金融危机过度恐慌以至于出台新的无效率的金融政策，那将是一个错误。

引用:

原帖由 学经济家 于 2008-5-10 10:12 发表
提醒读者，对美联储所谓的“救助”的负面效果，与国内的直接救助是质的差别。

此救助非直接的救助，钱是给胜者用于收购败者的，而非直接给败者。败机构的股东和团队基本上面临的是灭顶之灾，不要说割肉，可能连骨 ...

记·不太清楚，一位联邦储蓄保险公司的前主席，后来是表示过，很后悔当初的一些救助行动，其中包括非常大的机构。